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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS TO
CONVEY REAL ESTATE
It is well known that the underlying principle upon which
equity jurisprudence is based is the inadequacy of legal reme-
dies. The rule that equity will grant specific performance of
contracts for which actions at law are insuffcient and incom-
plete, is so well established in our system of law that no authori-
ties need to be cited. The general rule is that contracts will not
be specifically enforced by equity unless it is alleged and shown
that the renedy at law is inadequate. To this rule however,
there is an outstanding exception which is, perhaps, as old as
the rule itself. This exception governs the specific performance
of contracts to convey real estafe; and in this exception it is
emphatically laid down that equity will grant specific perform-
ance of contracts to convey real estate regardless of legal reme-
dies and their adequacy to give relief. It is clearly expressed in
the opinion of Vice Chancellor Leach in the case of Adderly v.
Dixon.' The rule began in England and has always been ap-
plied in English Courts. The courts of this country have adopted
the rule for the same reason that the English Courts applied it.
In the case of Kitchen v. Herring2 it is clearly stated in the
opinion of Judge Pearson and is much like the opinion of Vice
Chancellor Leach in the above cited case: "Equity adopts this
principle not because the land is fertile or rich in minerals, but
merely because it is land, a much favored subject in England
and other countries of Anglo-Saxon origin."
The expediency of such a law in England at the time it was
first applied cannot, I think, be doubted. It seems to the writer
to have been in harmony with the social and governmental sys-
tem. Land, partly because of its scarcity, perhaps, but generally
because of its power to determine the financial, social and politi-
cal status of every British subject, was naturally a highly
favored subject in the courts of Britain. The courts of that
cbuntry it seems, were fully justified in assuming, under the
existing circumstances, that all land did have a special and
'1 Eng. Chan. 607, 57 Eng. Rpts. 239 (1824).
242 N. C. 137 (1851).
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peculiar valie. Land was power and influence and those were
things much desired.
We are of the opinion that with us the law is hereditary and
is not based upon the grounds of expediency. There is no doubt
but that the rule applies in this country and is sustained by the
great weight of authority. Most of the states of this country
have followed the rule blindly. Most of the states are inclined
to give specific performance for contracts to convey real prop-
erty even though there is an adequate remedy at law, the court
assuming that all land has a special and peculiar value as did
the English courts.
The Alabama courts hold that a plea of adequate remedy at
law is no defense, and specific performance will be decreed re-
gardless. This is exactly in accord with the old English view.3
But in Rushton v. McKee & Co.4 we find Mayfield, J., speaking
for the court, saying: "Specific performance will not be had,
if the performance, as distinguished from damages or compen-
sation in money for the breach, cannot be of importance to the
complainant. "
The Arizona courts hold that when the contract itself is
valid and unobjectionable, specific performance will be granted
as a matter of course." The appellate court of Arkansas in two
late cases 6 also holds that specific performance should be given
without regard to adequacy of remedy at law.
The courts of California have gone so far as to hold that
specific perforpnance will be granted even though there is a
statute providing an adequate remedy.7
Michigan courts have held that specific performance is a
matter of judicial discretion and not arbitrary discretion, and
that the courts should follow the weight of authority which is to
grant specific performance as a matter of course. s New Hamp-
shire also agrees with the English doctrine as to specific perform-
ance of contracts to convey land.9
3Stone v. Gover, 173 Ala. 1, 55 So. 618 (1911); Williams v. Kiz.
patrick, 195 Ala. 563, 70 So. 742 (1916).
4201 Ala. 49, 77 So. 343 (1917).
" Timbal v. Statler, 20 Ariz. 81, 176 Pac. 843 (1918).
0 Dollar v. Knight, 145 Ark. 522, 224 S. W. 983 (1920); Wilkins v.
Eanes, 126 Ark. 339, 190 S. W. 99 (1916).
"McCarty v. Wilson, 184 Calif. 194, 193 Pac. 578 (1920); Calif. Code
of Civil Procedure 1554.8 Baller v. Spivack, 213 Mich. 436, 182 N. W. 70 (1921).
9Kann v. Wausan Abrasives Co., 81 N. H. 535, 129 Atl. 378 (1925).
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The. courts of New York are also in accord with the weight
of authority as may be seen by a statement in the opinion of
Judge Chester in the case of Jones v. Barnes :10 "The fact that
the defendant was responsible at law and that the plaintiff has
an adequate remedy at law does not preclude the plaintiff from
suing for specific performance." Other New York cases follow-
ing this view are Stone v. Lord., and Crary v. Smith."' However,
in the recent case of 276 Spring Street Corporation v. Forbes'2
on demurrer it was held that in a purchaser's action for specific
performance, an allegation that the purchaser had adequate
remedy at law was good as a-complete defense, if sustained by
proof.
North Carolina follows the English doctrine and holds that
if the contract is valid it will be specifically enforced on the
assumption that there can be no .adequate remedy.' 3
In North Dakota the legislature adopted the English doc-
trine as to specific performance of contracts to convey real prop-
erty.14
Oklahoma holds emphatically that damages are not an ade-
quate remedy for the breach of a contract to convey land.' 5
The courts of Wisconsin in the case of Hunholz v. Hedz'8
specifically enforced a contract to exchange lots. Damages
could have been given, but it was assumed that they Were not
sufficient. The earlier case of Curtis Land and Loan Go. v. In-
terior Land Co. 17 is a better reasoned case.
Utah is in accord with the English view.3s
There are a number of cases that hold expressly that the
inadequacy of legal remedy need not be alleged, for it will be
assumed from the subject matter, which is land, that the remedy
would be inadequate.' 9
-094 N. Y. S. 695 (1905).
IL80 N. Y. 6 (18.0); 2 N. Y. 60 (1S48).
235 N. Y. S. 523 (1929).
"Whittea v. Fuquay, 127 N. C. 68, 37 S. E. 141 (1900); Boles v.
Caudle, 133 N. C. 528, 45 S. E. 835 (1903). *
L4 OrfieZd v. Harney, 33 N. D. 568, 157 N. W. 124 (1916); Compiled
Laws of North Dakota, 1913, Sees. 7189, 7194.
"Kelley v. Mosby, 34 Okla. 218, 124 Pac. 984 (1912); Berry v.
Church, 37 Okla. 117, 130 Pac. 585 (1913).10 141 Wis. 222, 124 N. W. 257 (1910).
21137 Wis. 341, 118 N. W. 853 (1908).
2 GledhiZZ v. Walruf, 58 Utah 105, 197 Pac. 725 (1921).
2, Steesland v. Noel, 28 S, Dak. 522, 134 X. W. 207 (1912).
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The federal courts also follow the English doctrine. In the
case of Williams v. Cow Gulch Oil Co. 20 Judge Sanborn says:
"An action at law for damages for the breach of a contract to
convey land does not afford as adequate a remedy as a suit in
equity for specific performance. . . . The action at law does not
place the parties in the same position as before the agreement
and it is not prompt, complete, and efficient." Other federal
cases may be noted.21
There are a few states that appear to be overthrowing the
old English rule and insisting that the real property have some
peculiar and special value to the one seeking the enforcement.
The most noticeable of these cases is the recent case of Duck-
worth v. Michel.22 While the theory of the action is not clear,
it was in substance an action seeking the specific performance
of a lease contract. The court, speaking through Tolman, Judge,
says: "The rule is not infallible and ought not to be applied
where an action for damages will afford. adequate relief."
And, in the Florida case of Le Noir v. McDanieZ23 Judge
Ellis says: "The exercise of equity jurisprudence for the spe-
cific performance of contracts for the purchase of property does
not depend upon any distinction between real and personal prop-
erty, but depends on the question whether damages at law may
not in the particular case afford a complete remedy." To the
same effect is the case of Frue v. Houghton.2 4 The language of
Judge Ellis seems to us to indicate the logical point of view.
Why should the complaining party not be forced to show a
peculiar value in real property as well as personalty? Should
he not be compelled to allege and show that his remedy for the
breach in a court of law is inadequate? Much of the property
transactions that are carried on now are speculative and the
property is not intended to be used as such. If this is not the
intention of the parties buying, then it would seem to us that
they could very easily show that to them the property had a
special and peculiar value and that damages would not be suffi-
cient. We cannot in general see the uniqueness of land in this
2*270 Fed. 9 (1921).
aMcLung v. Crawford, 209 Fed. 340 (1913); Boyce v. Grundy, 3
Peters 210 (1830); Donahue v. Franks, 199 Fed. 262 (1912).
'19 Pac. (2nd) 914 (Wash., 1933).
480 Fla. 500, 86 So. 435 (1920).
6 Colo. 318 (1882) (dictum).
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country. It is not the basis of our social, political, or govern-
mental system, nor does it, just because it is land, bring any
power to the owner. If the buyer would be empowered by hold-
ing such land, then he could easily show a peculiar and special
value in the land and receive the equitable relief. Real prop-
erty is not sacred and should not be considered so. In fact, in
the recent case of Dii-ckworth v. Miche125 we find Tolman, Judge,
saying: "To the common law title to real estate was as sacred
as was a prerogative of the King. Under modern conditions,
title to real estate is but a property right, little, if any, superior
in the eyes of the law to any other property right." And, in
this country where money "does the talking" rather than land,
why shouldn't money satisfy in all cases where there is no spe-
cial or peculiar value attached to the land by the party com-
plaining? This seems to be the logical holding for this country.
Among other cases that approve of this view are Forrister v.
Sullivan20 in which the court said, "The contract must be
grounded on adequate and legal consideration and it must
clearly appear to the chancellor that law could not give adequate
relief in damages."27 Some of the courts of this country hold
that where the party buying has already agreed to sell to a third
party, he cannot get specific performance because the inade-
quacy is rebutted and it is shown that money will satisfy.2 8
There is an interesting case that arose in Mississippi.2 9 In
this case A contracted to sell a certain tract of land to B. A
then contracted to sell to C. The land rose in value. It was
apparent that B only wanted the land because it was worth
more than he had contracted to pay. The court held that dam-
ages for the breach would afford an ample redress. It is sub-
mitted that the court took the proper stand and rightfully re-
fused specific performance.
Very few Kentucky cases can be found. The prevailing
tendency is to follow the majority rule.30 However, there is a
519 Pac. (2nd) 914 (1933).
231 Mo. 345, 132 S. W. 722 (1910): parol contract to convey land.
"'Herryford v. Moore, 181 S. W. 389 (1915); Dazey v. Elvin, 153
Mo. App. 435, 134 S. W. 85 (1911); Oliver v. Johnson, 238 Mo. 359, 142
S. W. 274 (1911).
2sMarthison v. King, 150 red. 48 (1906); Thweatt v. Jones, 87 Fed.
268 (1898); Haxelton v. Miller, 25 A. P. 337 (1905).
Cf urtis v. Blair, 26 Miss. 309 (1853).
'McGee v. Beall, 13 Ky. 190 (1823).
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recent case, Clifton Land Company v. Reister,3 1 which htolds
"Specific performance of a contract for the sale of laild does
not go as a matter of course, but it is withheld or granted accord-
ing as equity and justice demand under the circumstance."
However, the court probably only has reference to those cases
where it would be manifestly inequitable to decree specific per-
formance due to some objectionable feature of the contract, and
not because the plaintiff could be compensated in damages.
It is the belief of the writers that specific performance of
contracts to convey real estate should never be decreed unless
the complainant alleges and proves that an action at law for
damages would not afford an adequate relief for the breach.
This is in accord with the principles of equity as to other con-
tracts, and reaches a desirable result.
ROBT. BiRD.
Wimnamm E. FAMwNG.
186 KY. 155, 216 S. W. 342 (1919).
